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Abstract 
In this paper a comprehensive framework for measuring total gross seigniorage as suggested by 
Neumann was employed to analyze the implications of economic openness and inflation in dollarised 
developing countries with special reference to Ghana within the context of an extended Cagan model.
Using quarterly data, the paper examined the relationship between inflation and seigniorage for the 
1996-2005 period and shows how analogous this relationship is to the popular Laffer curve comprising 
seigniorage generation and inflation rates for Ghana. The main findings of this study are that, in Ghana, 
economic openness Granger-causes inflation and dollarisation whilst seigniorage-maximizing rate of 
inflation varies from 102% in the short-run to 74% in the long-run. On the average, foreign currencies 
constitute more than one-third of the total monetary aggregates in developing countries which is a 
testimony of high levels of dollarisation making the effectiveness of monetary policies below par. Based 
on the empirical results, the paper recommends that in dollarised developing countries such as Ghana, 
the appropriate policy option to deepen the financial sector should not be that which  focuses on arbitrary 
opening of the economy which has the potential of promoting dollarisation of the economy causing 
inflation and making monetary policy implementation ineffective. Furthermore, considering the high 
inflation threshold for seigniorage maximization, it would be prudent for Ghana to find an alternative 
source of budget finance that is non-inflationary in the long-run.
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1.0 Introduction
Underdeveloped economies being traditionally small-open are more exposed to persistent high 
rate of price fluctuations, high interest rates and foreign exchange risks. Besides these problems, 
the countries are confronted with low income per capita and hence low levels of consumption 
and saving which invariably imposes a limit to which government can mobilise tax revenue to 
finance its huge fiscal and trade deficits. Economic agents, including governments of these 
countries, as a consequence of the aforementioned problems, more often than not, are engrossed 
in devising strategies to effectively hedge against the concomitant risks of losing the value of 
their financial assets. Within the private sector, dollarisation has emerged as a common and easy 
means of safeguarding the value of wealth and hedging against financial risks in developing 
countries in recent times. Using a foreign currency such as the US dollar, the British Pound 
Sterling or the Euro which is economically hard in nature in place of the relatively economically 
soft local currency has become even more convenient and cheaper under financial sector 
deregulation in which flexible exchange rate system is practised. 
2Dollarisation has the tendency of worsening the macroeconomic imbalance in an already 
constrained developing economy. For instance, in Latin America, particularly Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico and Peru; in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), notably Vietnam, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Belarus and Georgia; and in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Togo, Lesotho, Cape Verde, 
Nigeria and Kenya within the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region, increased business transactions 
in foreign currencies in recent times, has at one time or the other exacerbated their 
macroeconomic imbalance. This suggests that the wider the macroeconomic imbalance, the more
likely the severity of dollarisation in an economy. 
A central issue in the dollarisation theory has been the loss of seigniorage revenue suffered by 
the dollarizing country as it transfers its money creation monopoly to the more stable advanced 
economy whose currency is being widely used in the dollarized economy. For countries which 
seigniorage is a significant source of government revenue, unilateral dollarisation may be 
prohibitively expensive in the short-run until greater financial stability and credibility is achieved 
in the long-run. For a country of primary currency such as the United States or the United 
Kingdom, the currency used by dollarized economies reaps substantial benefits. The United 
States (US), for instance, derives enormous seigniorage – the difference between the cost of 
printing or minting money and its face value – from the rest of the world, particularly from 
dollarized developing countries. Meanwhile, seigniorage is of more importance as a source of 
revenue to developing countries that are relatively less efficient in raising sufficient funds 
through bonds, taxation and borrowing to finance public projects. For example, Hochreiter, 
Rovelli and Winckler (1996) find that seigniorage as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) 
was approximately 30% in Romania, 4% in Hungary, 1% for Czech Republic, Austria and 
Germany in 1993. In Southern European countries, seigniorage-GDP ratio varies between two 
and four percent (Horrendorf, 1997). In developing countries due to underdevelopment of the 
domestic financial markets and the restrictions on foreign exchange, governments find it difficult 
to finance budget deficits through sources other than monetisation. As the government finances 
its budget deficits by borrowing from the central bank, money supply increases resulting in 
inflation with implications for seigniorage-revenue generation. 
Even though openness of an economy is meant to widen and deepen markets, and in effect 
improve the opportunity for domestic borrowing, one likely consequences of opening the 
financial sector is the resultant reduced seigniorage creation capacity of the government due to a 
decreasing demand for local currency in the presence of foreign currencies and foreign financial 
assets (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Fabris and Vukajlović-Grba, 2004). Thus, severe 
dollarisation imposes a serious threat to the effective implementation of macroeconomic policies
with complex implications for achieving macroeconomic policy objectives. For instance, until 
demand for money function is correctly defined to encompass foreign currencies in circulation, 
the traditional monopolistic tendency of the government to generate seigniorage would be 
inhibited as a result of low demand for the domestic currency. 
Given the above, the key policy puzzle challenging governments of developing countries is how 
to effectively implement economic liberalisation programmes without unduly sacrificing 
economic stability and seigniorage revenue in an unofficially dollarized economic environment. 
Unfortunately, till date this puzzle has not received much attention in econometric explorations. 
Therefore, in an attempt to provide an understanding to this policy dilemma confronting
3developing countries, this paper is set out to empirically measure the degree of dollarisation and 
seigniorage for some selected developing countries as well as explore the specific policy
implications for macroeconomic stability for Ghana. The paper also seeks to investigate whether 
government has succeeded in maximising seigniorage revenue in Ghana during the post-
liberalisation era. The specific objectives of this paper are to: (i) determine the correlation 
coefficients of inflation, inflation tax, economic openness and dollarisation on seigniorage for 
selected developing countries; (ii) estimate the long-run and short-run dynamics of the 
relationship between seigniorage and inflation in accordance to the Laffer Effect Model; (iii) 
calibrate the short-run as well as the long-run seigniorage-maximizing inflation; (iv) unearth the 
short-run and the long-run macroeconomic determinants of seigniorage and (v) trace the line(s) 
of Granger-causality among seigniorage, economic openness, dollarisation and inflation.
The remaining part of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical issues 
involving dollarisation, seigniorage, inflation tax and economic openness. Besides, in this 
section, the Cagan model-Laffer effect, some empirical evidences and a summary of some 
stylized facts and historical antecedents of dollarisation in SSA are discussed. The data, 
econometric models, and methodology are specified in section 3. In section 4, the empirical 
results are reported and interpreted; policy implications and recommendations constitute section 
5, whilst concluding remarks are presented in section 6.
2.0 Dollarisation, Seigniorage, Inflation Tax and Openness: The Theoretical Issues
2.1.1 The Concept and Measurement of Dollarisation
Under particularly high inflationary circumstances, the demand for foreign currencies and 
financial assets denominated in foreign currencies rises resulting in dollarisation. Dollarisation 
can be defined as the preferred use of foreign currencies over a domestic currency in performing 
the traditional functions of money without official sanction by a government. Where a 
government endorses for the use of foreign currencies alongside the domestic currency in 
performing the basic functions of money in an economy, dollarisation is no longer unofficial but 
de jure. It is quite obvious that dollarisation has far-reaching consequences for government 
revenue mobilisation through money creation and effective stabilization of macroeconomic 
environment.
The ratio of Foreign Currency Deposits (FCD) to broad money (M2) is the simplest and most 
widely used proxy for currency substitution in an economy, although this approximation 
represents only the lower bound for the actual level of currency substitution, given that foreign 
currencies in circulation are omitted (Komárek and Melecký, 2001). In developing and transition 
economies where the financial sector is less developed and instability of the macroeconomy is a 
universal permanent feature, more foreign currencies are likely to be in circulation than banked 
with formal financial institutions, but it is practically difficult to quantify, and as at now,
impossible to accurately and completely determine.
Thus, due to lack of data on the amount or quantity of foreign currencies in circulation (FCC), 
the determination of dollarisation has been narrowly dependent on the observable amount of 
foreign currency deposits (FCD) as a component proxy for dollarisation. Given that foreign 
currencies are not issued by the local central bank and there are good reasons to suspect that 
significant amount of money transfers from overseas pass through unofficial routes, the difficulty 
4in determining the amount of FCC is obvious. Therefore, though inadequate, empirical studies 
involving dollarisation and currency substitution, associated with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), often employ the ratio of FCD to broad money (FCD/BM) as the measure of the 
extent to which an economy is dollarized. We denote this traditional dollarisation index (DDI) 
which is adopted in this study as:
DDI  (FCD/BM)  (FCD/M2) [2.1.1]
2.1.2 The Concept and Measurement of Seigniorage and Inflation Tax
Theoretically, classical literature seems to suggest different definitions of seigniorage1. Perhaps, 
the summary of the most common definition of seigniorage is the value of real resources 
acquired by the government through its ability to print money (Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch, 
1994).  The various definitions have led to the emergence of four main approaches to 
understanding and determining adoption of money creation by governments to generate revenue. 
These approaches are the fiscal dominance, optimal taxation, seigniorage-maximization and 
opportunity cost seigniorage hypotheses. The fiscal-dominant seigniorage hypothesis as 
proposed by Klein and Neumann (1990); and Neumann, (1996) suggests that if fiscal policy is 
dominant such that the monetary authorities cannot influence the real deficit net of interest 
payments, money supply becomes endogenous. At a certain level of the debt ratio, the public is 
no longer willing or able to absorb the excess government debt. In effect, fiscal seigniorage 
measures the proportion of seigniorage received by government purposely for budget financing. 
According to Sargent and Wallace (1981) under this circumstance, the monetary authorities will 
be compelled to finance the deficit by creating money in the economy. Mathematically, fiscal 
seigniorage can be computed as d r
t
G G
P

; where Gd represents government debt; Gr denotes net 
profit allocated from central bank to the government; and Pt is the general consumer price level. 
The optimal-taxation seigniorage hypothesis put forward by Bailey (1956), Mankiw (1987),
Poterba and Rotemberg (1990), and Edwards and Tabellini (1991) aligns itself with the 
minimisation of the social costs from different forms of resources, mainly conventional tax and 
seigniorage. Under this circumstance, seigniorage is defined as inflation tax and measured as 
where  is the rate of inflation and  is the real high-powered money and computed as total 
base money divided by consumer price level. The empirical work of Campillo and Miron (1996) 
is consistent with the view that optimal tax considerations are necessary in determining the rate 
of inflation.
The seigniorage-maximization hypothesis focuses on maximizing specific variety of revenue 
which is basically the total revenue derived from money creation and possession due to the 
monopoly powers of the central bank. Seigniorage as total revenue associated with money 
creation can be determined as m r  such that m is the growth rate of nominal high-powered 
money; r is real rate of interest minus rate of population growth; and  denotes the real stock of 
interest bearing government assets, in a manner that .  The opportunity cost seigniorage 
hypothesis is formulated to determine the additional real income that the household sector would 
                                                
1 The term seigniorage originated from the French word seigneur which was used for the feudal lord of the Middle 
Age because he had a monopoly power on his land to coin money (Blanchard, 1997).
5have earned if they had held interest-bearing financial assets instead of non-interest bearing 
money. The real interest earnings sacrificed for holding money is the opportunity cost. 
Mathematically, real opportunity cost seigniorage is measured as i where i is the nominal 
interest rate. The monetary seigniorage hypothesis, arguably, is the most commonly used 
seigniorage measure in empirical works, captures the transactions value of non-monetary assets 
that money holders trade in with the monetary authority to obtain the desired increase in the real 
base money balances ( )M . Alternatively, monetary seigniorage can be defined as the change in 
base money outstanding ( )M deflated by the consumer price level.
Honohan (1996) proposes the under-listed alternative approaches for measuring of seigniorage 
revenues which should be chosen based on the focus of any particular empirical work:
 the product of the rate of growth and real monetary base which captures the actual 
amount of tax received by the government. This cash flow measure illustrates the real 
purchases the government finances by printing money;
 the product of nominal interest rate and the real monetary base which determines the
opportunity costs households suffer for holding money rather than other liquid assets 
which also embrace the tax component of seigniorage; and
 the product of inflation and the real monetary base, which represents the dwindling 
purchasing power of money balances. This, thus, reflects the capital levy aspect of 
seigniorage to the amount that it varies from the interest measure by the unanticipated 
inflation.
From the above and in the context of this study, seigniorage is decomposed into two components 
– real seigniorage and inflation tax. Given that seigniorage is defined as 1( ) t tt
t
M M
S M
P
  
where Mt is the monetary base at time t and Pt is the price level at time t; it follows that if real 
holding of monetary base by residents is defined as tt
t
M
m
P
 ; then seigniorage can be 
transformed into: 
1( )t t t t tS m m m   ; where 1 .t tt
t
P P
P
  [2.1.2]
The first term of St is the real seigniorage because it connotes the rise in money holding 
emerging from money demand by residents; whereas the second term captures inflation tax. In 
this case, t is considered as inflation tax rate and tm is the tax base, such that if 0,t  then 
the government receives no revenue from inflation, but as inflation rate rises, people would 
reduce their holdings of the money base due to the fact that monetary base is now more costly to 
hold. In effect, a government can decrease the real value of the non-interest-bearing part of the 
government debt by using inflation (Begg, Fischer, and Dornbusch, 1994). Inflation is 
considered a tax within this framework because it reduces the government’s liability to residents 
with regard to the local currency issued, which implies that if real balance is small, higher 
inflation is required to raise inflation tax. Inflation tax is, thus, the increase in nominal money 
balances which households have to accumulate to keep their real balances constant in an 
inflationary environment.
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positive or high without inflation being necessarily positive or high.2 This can occur when an 
economy is experiencing rapid real growth especially during the early stages of transition,
emergence or recovery. The government of such an economy may be compelled to print more
money for the payment of public investment activities thereby increasing money supply to meet 
the increased demand in the growing economy. This condition can generate seigniorage in a non-
inflationary environment. In an economic environment where seigniorage is used excessively as 
a means of revenue generation, seigniorage is pro-inflation. Broadly, the hypotheses suggest that 
the role of monetary authorities in creating money and maintaining money is the cause of 
seigniorage. Seigniorage generation has the potential of influencing aggregate money supply and 
hence the rate of inflation if supply of money does not equate supply of goods and services 
which might increase rent-seeking activities including dollarisation.
2.1.3 Concept and Measurement of Economic Openness
An economy is opened when its key sectors are less restricted and controlled by the state such 
that the increased private sector participation leads to increasing significance of the foreign 
sector through higher exports and imports. Economic openness (EOP) is synonymous to 
economic liberalisation that involves essentially trade (both domestic and foreign) and finance 
(that includes banking and non-banking such as trade). In this study, the conventional index for 
EOP is used albeit it has a number of shortcomings. Thus:
( ) /EOP X M GDP  ; [2.1.3]
where X denotes total exports; M stands for total imports; and GDP is the gross domestic 
product.
The most obvious limitations of this measurement include the differences in magnitude of X and 
M, and the exclusion of policy variables that impact on trade. Given these setbacks, Sachs and 
Warner (1995) constructed a dummy-variable-based index of economic openness of various
thresholds relating to non-tariff barriers of external trade, tariff barriers of foreign trade, and the 
variation in the black market exchange rate vis-à-vis the official rate. Other components of the
index include the degree of government control for the most important exports, and whether or 
not the economic system of a country is socialist or capitalist inclined3. This study adopted the 
conventional measure specified in [2.1.3] due to problems relating to data availability, adequacy 
of policy coverage, and questionable application of weights to the various components of the 
dummy-variable-based index.
2.2 Seigniorage-Maximizing Inflation and the Cagan Model: The Laffer Curve Effect
Komárek and Melecký (2001) observe that where there is a high substitutability of the domestic 
currency with foreign currencies, it becomes difficult for governments to pursue deficit finance 
by printing money, which in the recent past, has been a common practice in most developing 
countries. The demand for foreign currencies, on one hand, enhances seigniorage, whilst on the 
                                                
2 Mundell (1971) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999) also separate seigniorage from inflation tax. In the words o 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999), seigniorage revenue typically exceeds inflation tax revenue in a growing economy as 
the government can print money to offset a rising demand for real balances without generating inflation.
3 Quinn (1997), Miniane (2004), and Chinn and Ito (2007) propose different measures of financial openness which 
are narrow in scope and focus on only international financial flows.
7other hand; it may act as an inflationary tax. Thus, in a dollarized economy, the resulting 
government revenue will be reduced at each level of inflationary tax (Komárek and Melecký, 
2001). In the same vein, it has been observed that, to a reasonable extent, the displacement of a 
domestic currency by a foreign currency may promote macroeconomic stabilization and 
credibility of economic policies in small-open economies. For example, in transition and 
developing countries, credibility can increase when foreign currencies in circulation depress the 
efforts of monetary authorities to manipulate domestic currency. Thus, in the past, stabilization 
policies in emerging economies were characterized by the fixing of nominal exchange rates or 
establishing crawling pegs, which normally results in progressive appreciation (or over-
valuation) of exchange rates. However, when a domestic currency is significantly displaced by a 
foreign currency in an economy, there should automatically be narrower fluctuations in exchange 
rates to ensure stabilization (Komárek and Melecký, 2001).
From the above scenarios, when the rate of inflation is zero, the government obtains no revenue 
from inflation; however, the quantum of inflation tax received by the government would increase 
as the rate of inflation increases. As the inflation rate increases, people would reduce their 
holdings of the money base due to the fact that monetary base is now more costly to hold. Thus, 
individuals hold less currency, and banks hold as little excess reserves as possible, and 
eventually the real monetary base falls so much that the total amount of inflation tax revenue 
received by the government declines (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1994). Similarly, Fischer (1982) 
asserts that currency substitution or dollarisation can be substantially costly in terms of 
seigniorage that would be paid to a foreign country to import high-powered money, together with 
the excess welfare burden incurred by sacrificing independent control over the domestic rate of 
high-powered money creation for the domestic economy.
There is a possible nonlinear Laffer effect of a change in the rate of inflation on seigniorage 
revenue generation. Cagan (1956) proves that the semi-elasticity of the demand for money 
affects the ability of government to derive seigniorage when inflation rate exceeds a certain 
threshold, then seigniorage begins to decline. By implication, seigniorage revenue and inflation 
rate are not proportional to each other.
Given that generally the capacity of a government to receive tax revenue depends on the 
efficiency of the revenue collecting institutions, then following Huang and Wei (2006) and 
Alseina and Tabellini (1987) government’s balanced budget constraint can be specified as:
t t tG T   ; such that (0 1)  [2.2.1]
where G is the government’s budgeted expenditure;  is the efficiency coefficient of tax revenue 
mobilisation by revenue institutions which captures the proportion to tax revenue collected 
receivable by government; and T is the total amount of tax actually collected by the revenue 
institutions. If 0, then there is complete leakage, and the government collects no tax revenue; 
but if 1, then the institutional quality is at its peak and there is no leakage of revenue.
To capture the Laffer curve effect in seigniorage, equation [2.2.1] is transformed into equation 
[2.2.2] as follows:
( )eG T     ; [2.2.2]
8where e represents expected rate of inflation; 0  and is considered as the semi-elasticity of 
the demand for real money balances and captures the strength of the Laffer effect. The fact is that 
whenever 
1
,  then any rise in the rate of inflation would lead to an increase in gross 
seigniorage; but whenever the rate of inflation exceeds the threshold of * or 1  then any 
further increases in the rate of inflation will result in a total decline in gross seigniorage. This 
means that as ~ , the private sector avoids holding on to the domestic currency; hence the 
government collects no seigniorage revenue. In effect, given that all other things are remaining 
the same, rising inflation causes rising dollarisation but declining seigniorage-revenue in an 
economy, at least, in the short-run. The Laffer curve of seigniorage revenue maximizing inflation 
is presented in Figure 2.2 below.
Figure 2.2: Seigniorage-Maximizing Inflation Laffer curve
SEI (%)
                             
   SEI*                         
  SEI**
   SEI1
               
                        A          B
               1 2    *    3 4  (%)
                       
In Figure 2.2 above, SEI denotes seigniorage revenue as a proportion of the GDP while 
denotes the rate of inflation in a domestic economy. The seigniorage-maximizing inflation 
position is where the average rate of inflation is * and the maximum seigniorage receivable in 
the long-run is **SEI whereas SEI* is receivable in the short-run. This is where the slope of the 
Laffer curve is zero (i.e. 0dSEI d  ). Prior to this point, higher rates of inflation were 
necessary to generate higher seigniorage revenue by means of increases in base money. 
However, beyond this point, higher rates of inflation results in lower revenue from seigniorage 
because economic agents would attempt to avoid holding base money balances so as to hedge 
themselves from incurring inflation tax as a result of the reduced real money balances in their 
hands. It can be deduced from Figure 2.2 that apart from the unique seigniorage-maximizing 
inflation rate ( * ), the same amount of seigniorage revenue (such as SEI1) is obtainable at two 
different rates of inflation as shown by 1 and 4 in the short-run and 2 and 3 in the long-run.
Thus, by implication the Laffer curve has a benefit side and a cost side. The benefit side of the 
Laffer curve is the rising side labelled A where 0dSEI d  , because it is this side that provides 
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of inflation through the printing of money. This is the side where higher tax rates match with 
higher tax base. Clearly, the cost side of the Laffer curve is falling part of the curve labelled B, 
where 0dSEI d  such that any further increase in the tax rate reduces the tax base resulting in 
lower seigniorage.
It should be conceivable that at any positive rate of inflation such as the optimum rate of 
inflation ( * ), the level of seigniorage-maximization revenue is likely to be higher in the short-
run than in the long-run due to the fact that in the short-run households are more likely to suffer 
from money illusions, moral hazards and information asymmetry. In the long-run, however, 
economic agents by rational expectations and behaviour are capable to reconstituting the 
aggregate composition of their demand for money portfolio. Usually, this would be done by
converting liquid assets such as cash into less liquid assets such as bonds; or from a local 
currency into foreign currencies such as the US dollar and the British pound sterling to which 
their local currency depreciates.
According to the fundamental Cagan (1956) model, demand for money is a function of inflation:
1d
tm e
   [2.2.3]
which is transformed into
0 1t t t tInM InP        [2.2.4]
in its natural logarithmic form, and where 1 is the semi-elasticity of money demand with 
respect to inflation which captures the opportunity cost of holding money due to inflation. In the 
original Cagan model, although factors other than determinants of money demand were stated, 
under hyperinflationary circumstances, the Cagan model focuses on the rate of inflation as 
principal determinant of real money balances. Given the foregoing, the seigniorage-maximising 
rate of inflation is * 11/ .  Thus, the money demand function with real GDP (y) and rate of 
inflation is 1 2dtm e y
    which is transformed into a natural logarithmic function as:
0 1 2t t t t tInM InP y         [2.2.5]
where 2 is the elasticity of the money demand with respect to y, so that 1 21/ y  becomes 
the seigniorage-maximizing inflation. This implies that as more explanatory variables are 
included in the model, estimated elasticity changes resulting in lower critical level of inflation 
rate. Therefore, being on the benefit side of the Laffer curve may have a different meaning now. 
Obviously, policies geared towards increasing revenue through inflation results in higher 
inflationary paths.
2.3 The Empirical Nexus
Saatçioğlu and Korap (2006) investigate the courses of inflation tax and seigniorage revenue for 
policy makers of the Turkish economy and observe that for the post-1980 period, the Turkish 
economy lies on the benefit side of the seigniorage-maximizing-inflation Laffer curve. On the 
contrary, the empirical works of Sauer and Lange (2006) reveal that dollarisation results in 
significant static losses of seigniorage revenue in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Besides, 
the results also show that revenue-sharing by the United States may fail to fully compensate the 
dollarized countries for the redistribution of seigniorage income; and that the resulting under-
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compensation worsens the burdens of dollarisation in all the four Latin American countries 
considered in the study.
Fritz-Krockow, et al (2005) observe that between 1996-2003 revenues derived from seigniorage 
reduced as a result of increasing dollarisation in Suriname. Between 1999 and 2001, seigniorage 
revenue was mainly obtained from inflation tax when inflation rate was about 66%. Thus, as 
inflation brought about a temporary rise in seigniorage, it also brought in its wake an increase in 
dollarisation in Suriname. Specifically, seigniorage revenue which traditionally forms 25% of tax 
revenue and approximately 6% of GDP between 1998 and 2000 declined to a mere 0.3% in 2003 
due to extreme dollarisation.
Dornbusch (2000) concedes that dollarisation leads to loss of seigniorage. However, this critical 
issue will be offset by “reduction in public debt service costs that result from reduced interest 
rates”. Globally, developing countries issue external debt in foreign currencies, hence the 
reduction in domestic interest rates is relevant only for international debts and governments 
always have the option of issuing even internal debts in foreign currencies so that the cost of debt 
service is reduced to the extent of exchange rate risk. For dollarisation to succeed in reducing the 
cost of debt service it must reduce country risk, otherwise if it produces a recession, country risk 
might increase instead.
Jefferson (1998) based on data from 1977 to 1995 reveals that seigniorage is an important source 
of government financing in the United States of America; a considerable proportion of which is 
obtained from emerging and transitional countries which have not succeeded in stabilizing their  
own currencies. This implies that dollarisation in developing countries improves seigniorage 
revenue mobilisation in advanced economies which have currencies circulating globally. 
Lizano (1997) predicts that if full dollarisation policy is pursued in Costa Rica, exchange risks 
and country risk would disappear. However, Goldfajn and Olivares (2000) reveal that though 
exchange risk does not exist in Panama following full dollarisation, Panama pays a higher 
premium than Costa Rica on the United States dollar bonds its government floats in international 
financial markets.
Cukierman, et al (1992) prove that seigniorage is an important source of government revenue for 
developing countries. Using time series data for the period 1971-1982, seigniorage defined as an 
increase in base money to a share of total government revenue accounted for more than 10% on 
the average. For example, the study reveals that seigniorage was 28.0%, 24.8%, 23.9%, 21.6%, 
and 13.1% for Ghana, Uganda, Mexico, Bolivia and India respectively.
2.3.1 Relevant Macroeconomic Stylised Facts on Sub-Saharan Africa
Developing countries embarked upon massive economic reforms and restructuring programmes 
in the 1980s towards recovery. These programmes were essentially aimed at opening, 
deregulation and transformation of these developing economies to become more competitive and 
market-oriented. As a result of this, foreign exchange regimes were switched from fixed to 
flexible which, in effect, increased and made easier access to foreign currencies by the public. 
Economic openness and the implementation of trade and financial liberalisation programmes 
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then became the mainspring of dollarisation in most of these developing economies that are 
traditionally characterised with higher growth rates in money supply and prices.
Consequently, since the past-two decades, it has become quite common to find firms in 
developing countries, especially those within the services sector pricing their services in foreign 
currencies. For instance, in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as well as in Latin America nearly all 
highly-rated hotels, esteemed private schools, travel and tour companies, construction 
companies, research and consultancy institutions and mortgage firms quote the prices of their 
services in foreign currencies. Apart from these services, many durable household items such as 
DStv and computers; and sophisticated fixed assets such as brand new motor vehicles and other 
machinery of foreign origin are priced in foreign currencies. The preference of the foreign 
currencies over the local currency emancipates from the fact that foreign currencies are more 
stable in value than the highly downward-oscillating local currency. 
Adenutsi and Yartey (2007) provide ample evidence that there exits a high degree of 
dollarisation, measured as FCD/M2, in transition and developing countries. Overall, out of the 24 
sampled countries, developing countries are 16 including seven SSA countries while the 
remaining eight countries are transition the average index of dollarisation was 34.88%. For 
countries in transition the average rate of dollarisation was 30.23% whilst for developing 
countries it was 37.21%.
According to Adenutsi and Yartey (2007) the general likely reasons behind the high prevalence
of dollarisation in developing and transition economies are:
 Macroeconomic instability as a result of high rates of inflation, wide fluctuations and 
volatility of nominal exchange rates, wide interest rates spread, and the loss of confidence 
in the domestic currency;
 Episodes of financial market crisis and risk-averse attitude of investors, firms and 
households in an attempt to hedge against potential financial risk of holding local 
currency;
 A history of colonialism (i.e. the continuous link with former colonial masters in trade 
and public finance);
 Size of the economy and its openness and dependency on international trade;
 Lack of credible macroeconomic policy and non-autonomy of the central bank;
 Over-dependence on imports and continuous current account deficit;
 The lack of higher denomination of bank notes issued by the local central banks;
 The active prevalence of large underground or unofficial economic activities such as
money laundering, public sector corruption and bribery, the manufacturing (or smuggling 
routes or centres) of banned drugs;
 Political instability or uncertainty;
 Imperfect and costly money market information;
 Non-existing or underdevelopment of capital and money markets;
 Low involvement in international capital markets;
 Excessively high international reserves;
 Relative convenient portability;
 Loss of confidence in the domestic economy due to a combination of the above factors; 
and,
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 High level of international tourism and its allied socioeconomic activities.
3.0 Model Specification, Data and Methodology
3.1 The Empirical Models
3.1.1 The Laffer Curve Effect Model
In an attempt to determine the seigniorage-maximizing rate of inflation *( ) as shown in Figure 
2.2 above, a simple quadratic model involving seigniorage (SEI) and inflation (INF) of the form 
(3.1.1.1) and (3.1.1.2) are estimated for the long-run and short-run relationships respectively:
2
0 1 2t t t tSEI INF INF       ; a priori 1 20; 0            [3.1.1.1]
2
0 1 2 3 1t t t t tSEI INF INF             ; a priori 1 2 30; , 0         [3.1.1.2]
where  is the white-noise residual; 0 is the constant term of the regression line that is not 
expected to be necessarily significant statistically. In the case of (3.1.1.2), 1t  is the error-
correction term. The estimated parameters imply that seigniorage falls after an optimal rate of 
inflation.
3.1.2 The Extended Cagan Model
In an attempt to establish the macroeconomic determinants of seigniorage a more comprehensive 
model of Cagan origin which also reflects the works of Komárek and Melecký (2001) and Fritz-
Krockow et al (2005) is considered. This model is relevant because its estimation would unearth 
the relevant short-run and long-run macroeconomic determinants of seigniorage compared with 
the Laffer Curve Effect model which is aimed at just determining the functional relationship 
between seigniorage and inflation. The general form of the extended Cagan model is:
( , , , , , )t t t t t t tSEI f FBB INF DDI EOP DAB FND                      [3.1.2.1]
where SEI measured in consonance with the monetary seigniorage hypothesis, INF, EOP, and 
DDI are as previously defined, FBB represents fiscal budget balance (Gr-Ge), DAB stands for 
domestic absorption (GDP-NX) which is a proxy for domestic market size, FND denotes 
financial deepening measured as ( 2 /M GDP ) to capture the level of financial development.
The empirical Long-Run Equilibrium Condition Model formulated for evaluation in line with 
[3.1.2.1] is:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6t t t t t t t tSEI FBB INF DDI DAB EOP FND                            [3.1.2.2]
It is expected a priori that the estimated coefficients of equation (3.1.2.2) shall possess the 
following signs: 0 4 5, , 0;    1 3 6, , 0    , and 2 0. 
The empirical SRECM models that are determinable alongside [3.1.2.2] are the simple linear 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) models associated with the Short-Run Equilibrium-
Correction Mechanism Models (SRECMMs) that are evaluated to provide short-run information 
SEI are of the form:
  
4 4 4 4
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1 1 1 1
4 4 4
5 6 7 1
1 1 1
ˆ
t i t i i t i i t i i t i
i i i i
i t i i t i i t i t t
i i i
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DAB EOP FND z
    
    
   
   
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  
          
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   
  
        [3.1.2.3]
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where ˆ ~ (0)t I because SEI and the explanatory variables are cointegrated such that the residual 
2~ (0, ).t iid  The composition of t is similar to that of t as observed in above (3.1.2.3). The 
symbol  represents the first-differenced form of the variables in the model. The coefficient of 
the various explanatory variables, 1 2 7, ,.........,   , are the impact multipliers that measure the 
immediate impact that a change in the explanatory variables has on a change in the dependent 
variables. The feedback or adjustment effect is z and it indicates how much of the 
disequilibrium is being corrected.
3.2 Methodology and Data
The data are quarterly over the 1996(1)-2005(4) period. This period was selected to reflect the 
post-liberalisation era in Ghana. Other sources were obtained from the Statistical Bulletins of the 
Central Bank of Ghana and the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS). The required quarterly data used 
in the study include local currency in circulation (LCC), foreign currency deposits (FCD), 
narrow money (M1), broad money (M2), fiscal budget balance (FBB), inflation measured as the 
growth of consumer price index ( or INF), income measured as real GDP, exports (X) and
imports (M).
The study adopted the general to specific approach, which initially involved, a very general 
dynamic lag structure between the dependent and explanatory variables comprising their lagged 
levels and first differences with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation procedure. 
Subsequently, this overly long general specification is reduced into a parsimonious dynamic 
adjustment equation, using the variable deletion tests by ensuring that the overall summary 
statistics do not become significant, the Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria reach their 
minimum such that the random error term does not violate the fundamental underlying classical 
assumptions of the estimation technique.
In fact, since the exact functional form of quantitative relationships in econometrics are rarely 
deduced theoretically, but more often determined empirically; and with the notion that the Laffer 
curve effect may be violated or not exactly evidenced on Ghana, other functional forms such as 
linear, logarithmic and right-sided semi-logarithmic models were estimated so that the best 
observed result is reported. The estimation of the appropriate functional form of the Laffer Curve 
Effect Model is essential because it is possible that the shape or the cost side of the Laffer curve 
may not necessarily hold if any the following conditions prevail in an economy:
 if the rate of currency substitution or dollarisation is equal to the rate of inflation in 
excess of the optimal rate of inflation (i.e. * t DDI   ) such that * t  ;
 where information asymmetry is equitably efficient;
 where moral hazards and money illusions are at minimum;
 where population growth rate is at constant and equal to inflation; and,
 where tax revenue leakages are equal to zero due to improvements in the collection of 
taxes and efficient mechanisms are put in place to make tax collectors honestly 
committed to the tax collection exercise.
3.2.1 Granger-Causality Test: Dollarisation, Openness, Seigniorage and Inflation
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) postulate that a probable consequence of embarking upon a
financial liberalisation programme is a loss of seigniorage generating capacity for the 
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government emerging from decreases in demand for the local currency in the presence of 
alternative financial assets normally denominated in different currencies. Specifically, during the 
era of high inflation demand for foreign currencies and foreign currency denominated financial 
assets upsurges precipitating dollarisation. Dollarisation can have significant implications for the 
capacity of the government to derive revenue normally in the form of inflation tax4 from money 
creation.
To verify empirically whether or not the openness of the Ghanaian economy (EOP) is the cause 
of inflation, dollarisation, and seigniorage generation, the study adopted the statistical test 
suggested by Granger (1969, 1988) and further developed by Sims (1972). Thus, this study, upon 
the selection of a reasonable lag length, l, estimated a general bivariate regression of the form:
0 1 1 1 1.............. ............t t l t l t l t lA A A B B              [3.2.1]
where the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis is specified as 0...............1  l was 
estimated using the reported F-statistics. A and B in [3.2.1] represent the combinations of 
variables of empirical interest in this context namely EOP through INF, DDI to SEI. It is 
expected a priori that there exist a uni-directional line of causality from EOP through INF, DDI
to SEI.
3.2.2 Stationarity Tests
The study commenced with the tests for stationarity of the endogenous and exogenous variables 
within the framework of Augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test procedure. This test is important 
in order to avoid spurious regression which is a common problem when estimating a regression 
line with data whose generated process follows a time trend. The ADF test requires estimating an 
equation of the form:
0 1 1 2
1
;
p
t t l t l t
l
y y t y z 

           H0: β=0; H1: β>0, [3.2.2]
where ty is a vector for all time series variables under consideration in a particular regression 
model; tz is the error term; l is the optimal lag length of each variable chosen according to the 
Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria such that first-differenced terms make tz a white 
noise. 
3.2.3 Cointegration Test
In order to determine the equilibrium-correction condition for the introduction of the 
equilibrium-correction term into the Short-Run Equilibrium-Correction Mechanism Model 
(SRECMM), the study follows the Engle-Granger Cointegration test procedure. The classical 
                                                
4 Fischer (1982) and Friedman (1971) analyzing from the framework of the quantity theory of money pointed out 
that seigniorage can be obtained without necessarily creating inflationary pressure if high-powered money is 
adequately provided to meet the rapidly growing demand for goods and services in the economy. However, the fact 
remains that in practice, seigniorage is likely to result in inflation tax because that parallelism in the growth of 
money and the rate of real growth does not take place, especially in LDCs, since lack of simultaneous equilibrium 
conditions in the product, assets and foreign exchange markets.
15
limitations of this approach was improved by the alternative use of each I(1) variable as a 
regressand in order to determine the number of cointegrating equations.5
4.0 The Empirical Evidences
4.1 Degree of Dollarisation in Developing Countries
There is a high incidence of dollarisation in nearly all the twenty sampled countries irrespective 
of geographical location and monetary zone. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, average the 
incidence of dollarisation is 34.8% close to the 37.68% prevailing in the other developing 
countries. Averagely, at least, one-third of the total money supply in most developing countries 
comprises of foreign currencies. With the exception of Burundi (12.88%) and Estonia (16.03%) 
during the decade of 1996-2005, each of the twenty emerging economies sampled has foreign 
currencies constituting at least 20% of money supply. Detailed results on the degree of 
dollarisation in developing countries are provided in Table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1: Dollarisation Indices of Some Selected Developing Countries 1996-
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2005
Selected Sub-Saharan African  Countries (34.80)
Angola 29.4 42.9 53.0 66.7 66.4 63.9 67.3 58.9 57.7 56.0 56.20
Benin n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Botswana n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Burundi 2.7 4.3 6.3 6.0 6.5 6.6 12.1 21.7 32.7 29.9 12.88
Ghana 28.2 28.2 20.8 24.4 36.6 30.2 30.1 27.6 27.1 23.3 27.65
Nigeria n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Sierra Leone n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Tanzania 14.8 18.0 17.7 20.2 21.8 24.7 26.4 28.4 28.2 25.3 22.55
Zambia 29.7 35.7 55.7 57.8 67.9 60.1 62.2 58.4 64.6 54.9 54.70
Other Selected Developing Countries (37.68)
Albania 21.9 18.3 16.8 18.2 19.4 22.4 22.1 22.1 22.8 26.4 21.04
Armenia 21.0 33.5 39.8 48.1 49.1 50.3 49.7 53.9 55.5 60.3 46.12
Belarus 24.2 27.3 55.6 43.7 58.7 52.0 49.6 53.6 58.4 58.1 48.12
Bolivia 77.0 77.7 78.8 78.5 79.1 75.9 75.5 73.8 67.2 58.1 74.16
Cambodia 63.1 62.6 54.2 60.9 68.0 69.8 69.3 69.3 71.1 71.4 65.97
Estonia 10.3 15.4 15.7 14.6 19.2 12.3 16.8 16.0 18.8 21.2 16.03
Georgia 15.0 20.9 29.1 35.6 46.2 45.0 44.4 45.6 42.1 44.7 36.86
Kyrgyz Republic 8.7 15.4 23.9 27.8 28.1 25.1 29.7 27.2 26.1 28.1 24.01
Latvia 30.8 31.3 28.6 29.9 31.1 30.8 31.3 30.7 34.5 37.2 31.62
Lithuania 24.4 21.2 24.1 30.4 34.0 33.0 24.4 19.5 19.9 21.4 25.23
Vietnam 19.4 22.1 25.3 28.2 29.7 31.2 28.7 23.1 23.2 22.4 25.33
Author’s computations (%) n/a = not available because of absence of relevant data
4.2 Correlation Matrix of Inflation (INF), Economic Openness (EOP), Inflation Tax 
(INFTAX) and Dollarisation (DDI) on Seigniorage (SEI) in Developing Countries
The correlation matrix shows that generally inflation tax (INFTAX) and economic openness 
(EOP) have a strong positive relationship with seigniorage (SEI) in developing countries. In rare 
                                                
5 According to Mukherjee, White and Wuyts (2003) there is no point specifying and estimating a simultaneous 
model once the variables are stationary and cointegrating because such equations do not suffer from simultaneity 
bias.
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cases where there is a negative relationship between EOP and SEI, such correlations are not 
statistically strong. With the exception of Zambia (-40%), this casual relationship is often less 
than 30%. On the whole, dollarisation does not seem to have any strong correlation with 
seigniorage except for Latvia (85%), Ghana (72%), Tanzania (52%) and Lithuania (-55%). It 
can, thus, be concluded that dollarisation leads directly to loss of seigniorage in Lithuania (-
55%), Belarus (-28%), Vietnam (-28%), Kyrgyz Republic (-17%) and Bolivia (-7%).
Details of this correlation matrix and seigniorage as a percentage of GDP are presented in Table 
4.2 below.
Table 4.2: Seigniorage and the Correlation Matrix against INF, EOP, INFTAX and DDI
Developing Countries INF-SEI EOP-SEI INFTAX-SEI DDI-SEI
Sub-Saharan African Countries (4.84%)
Angola (4.64) 0.3506 0.27945 0.60552 0.0194
Benin (0.03) 0.2646 0.14576 0.50256 n/a
Botswana (0.09) -0.3676 -0.03000 0.48532 n/a
Burundi (0.04) -0.4911 -0.02953 0.86143 0.3077
Ghana (0.03) 0.1796 0.08656 0.75005 0.7216
Nigeria (38.55) 0.0895 0.70629 0.70537 n/a
Sierra Leone (0.06) 0.1467 0.65879 0.67868 n/a
Tanzania (0.02) -0.3172 0.61967 0.67941 0.5196
Zambia (0.09) 0.2650 -0.40155 0.76585 0.2682
Other Developing Countries (0.06%)*
Albania (0.01) 0.0458 0.10155 0.90644 0.3732
Armenia (0.02) 0.2332 -0.22394 0.43404 0.1493
Belarus (0.03) -0.6728 0.24120 0.93133 -0.2835
Bolivia (0.06) 0.2763 0.18476 0.92655 -0.0739
Cambodia (0.03) -0.2069 0.40429 0.68784 0.4533
Egypt (0.16) 0.2476 0.22068 0.93632 0.1720
Estonia (0.07) -0.2061 0.02667 0.57277 0.1510
Georgia (0.03) 0.1832 0.28552 0.53010 0.0315
Kyrgyz Republic (0.02) -0.8884 -0.08985 0.89386 -0.1718
Latvia (0.07) 0.2570 0.61245 0.61934 0.8447
Lithuania (0.05) -0.1002 0.66885 0.56621 -0.5503
Vietnam (0.11) 0.1196 0.42284 0.33129 -0.2784
Author’s computations Average (SEI/GDP)% for the decade (1996-2005) in parenthesis
n/a = not available
With the exception of Angola (4.64%) and Nigeria (38.55%), generally seigniorage revenue is 
low and less than one per cent in developing countries. Though the correlation between 
dollarisation and seigniorage appear to be weak across nations, except for Latvia (84%), Ghana 
(72%), Lithuania (-55%), and Tanzania (52%), this could be attributed to the limitations in the
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measurement of dollarisation as foreign currencies in circulation are indeterminable and hence 
ignored from the dollarisation index.
4.3 Results of Stationarity Tests
The results of stationarity test, as presented in Table 4.3 have suggest only DDI, EOP and FBB
are stationary on levels, hence I(0). All other variables used in this study are stationary after first-
differencing and hence are I(1). The number of lags used in the computation was determined by 
the Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria.
Table 4.3 Results of Stationarity Tests
VARIABLE
NUMBER 
OF 
LAGS*
ADF TEST 
STATISTIC
CRITICAL 
VALUE
LEVEL OF 
SIGNIFICANCE (%)
ORDER OF 
INTEGRATION
DAB 2 -4.874517 -3.6228 1 I(1)
DDI 1 -4.110695 -4.0990 1 I(0)
EOP 3 -4.228308 -3.5386 5 I(0)
FND 4 -2.144500 -1.9456 5 I(1)
FBB 1 -3.560665 -3.5312 5 I(0)
INF 5 -3.581365 -3.4824 5 I(1)
SEI 2 -3.042957 -2.9422 5 I(0)
Author’s computations
*
Determined according to Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria
4.4 Results of Granger Causality Test
The estimated results of the Granger Causality Tests are presented in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Results of Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistics
At Lag 1 At Lag 2 At Lag 3 At Lag 4 At Lag 5
DDI does not Granger Cause SEI
SEI does not Granger Cause DDI
0.88134
3.07400*
1.53027
2.05214
2.76403
3.30032**
0.67205
5.81590**
0.94961
8.59928**
EOP does not Granger Cause SEI
SEI does not Granger Cause EOP
0.17257
0.50460
0.61771
0.20981
0.50472
0.12850
0.84480
0.49336
0.92196
1.10498 
EOP does not Granger Cause DDI
DDI does not Granger Cause EOP
3.55125**
0.00890
0.88306
2.29002
1.47971
1.61888
1.38582
0.82871
1.50404
0.95738 
INF does not Granger Cause SEI
SEI does not Granger Cause INF
0.24114
0.20442
0.24262
0.08586
0.25851
0.13269
1.29477
0.10526
  2.58490
  0.75112
INF does not Granger Cause EOP
EOP does not Granger Cause INF
1.14044
5.14043**
0.27743
0.32333
0.11574
0.54006
0.08054
1.32416
  0.11034
  1.05000
INF does not Granger Cause DDI
DDI does not Granger Cause INF
2.93706*
1.02868
2.97768*
1.18123
0.68244
1.74605
0.42394
0.90918
  0.25480
  1.55068
Author’s computations **(*) = 1%(5%)  level of significance
4.5 Results of Modelling SEI by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
The estimated results of the Long-Run Equilibrium Regression Model (LRERM) and the Short-
Run Equilibrium-Correction Mechanism Model (SRECMM) are presented in Table 4.5 below.
From the estimated LRERM, financial deepening (FND) and inflation (INF) are the most 
18
significant long-run positive determinants of seigniorage whilst economic openness and the 
constant of the estimated regression line are the long-run negative determinants of seigniorage 
within the Ghanaian economy. The results also demonstrate that the estimated regression line is a 
good-fit with joint relevance of the explanatory variables. The Durbin Watson (DW) statistic of 
1.69 lies within the acceptable range of no serial correlation (i.e. between 1.05 and 2.95) at 1% 
level of significance. In the long-run, dollarisation, economic openness and fiscal budget balance 
are not statistically significant in determining the level of seigniorage.
Author’s computation ∆=first difference Notes: *5% significance level; **1% significance level
LRERM= Long-Run Equilibrium Regression Model; SRECMM= Short-Run Equilibrium-Correction Mechanism Model
Similarly, the results from the estimated SRECMM are statistically impressive given the reported 
partial R-squared of 96% in the absence of misspecification of functional form, serial correlation 
and the appropriate sign and significance of the lagged residual (RESID(-1)). Overall, the current 
level of seigniorage and inflation promote seigniorage revenue mobilisation in the short-run just 
Table 4.5: Estimated Results of Modelling SEI by OLS
LRERM Variables Coefficient t-statistic Summary Statistics and Diagnostic Tests
CON -20.69778 -4.133159** R-squared 0.654599
DAB -0.000115 -3.757291** Adjusted R-squared 0.589544
DDI 13.96669 1.458988 F-statistic 7.132032
EOP -10.71351 -1.846840 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000**
FBB -9.01E-05 -0.795680 Durbin-Watson stat 1.689770
FND 1388.625 5.295530** Cointegration Test (Residual ADF)    -4.9193
INF 0.045674 3.751055** Residual Critical Value (-3.612)**; DW=2.00
SRECMM Variables Coefficient t-statistic
CON -0.00958 -3.098885**
∆(SEI(-1)) -0.01222 -2.161253*
∆(SEI) 0.97000 1.18E+03**
∆(FBB(-1)) -0.02671 -3.345819**
∆(INF(-4)) -0.17103 -3.073221**
∆(INF(-1)) 0.13460 1.484411
∆(INF) 0.04562 2.646446*
∆(DDI(-4)) -0.07564 -2.149015*
∆(DDI) -0.01475 -2.229893*
∆(EOP(-3)) 0.07686 2.713139*
∆(EOP(-2)) -0.04433 -2.300441*
∆(EOP(-1)) -0.04648 -2.410129*
∆(EOP) -0.02546 -1.548705 Summary Statistics and Diagnostic Tests
∆(DAB(-3)) -0.08298 -2.601772* R-squared                   0.97549
∆(DAB(-1)) 0.06321 2.643729* Adjusted R-squared                  0.95762
∆(FND(-4)) 0.06377 2.921713* RESET Test Statistic                  -2.49366
∆(FND(-3)) 0.03519 2.717293* RESET Prob.                   0.99980
∆(FND(-2)) 0.06180 3.133726** F-statistic                   1.1E+08
∆(FND(-1)) 0.05464 2.784877* Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000**
∆(FND)
RESID(-1)
-0.02795
-0.03384
-1.890358
-3.110352**
ARCH Test Statistic
ARCH Probability
0.303674
0.585415
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as the depth of the financial sector from the first to the past-four quarters, economic openness 
during the last-three quarter as well as the rate of inflation and domestic absorption of the 
immediate past quarter. On the contrary, the current levels of economic openness and financial 
deepening; fiscal balance and economic openness during the immediate past-quarter; economic 
openness at the second quarter; domestic absorption during the third quarter, dollarisation and 
inflation during the fourth quarter impede seigniorage-revenue mobilisation potential of Ghana 
by the extent of their respective coefficients for a one per rise in any of these variables.
The finding that dollarisation of the Ghanaian economy is the consequence of low seigniorage-
revenue generation validates the theoretical and empirical works of McKinnon (1973), Shaw 
(1973), Fischer (1982), Dornbusch and Fischer (1994), Dornbusch (2000), Komárek and 
Melecký (2001), Fabris and Vukajlović-Grba (2004), Fritz-Krockow, et al (2005), and Sauer and 
Lange (2006).
The estimated OLS results do not appear to lend empirical support to Sargent and Wallace 
(1981), Klein and Neumann (1990), and Neumann (1996) fiscal-dominant seigniorage 
hypothesis, since fiscal budget balance does not promote seigniorage revenue mobilisation in 
Ghana. Conversely, the consistent positive relationship between financial deepening and 
seigniorage in the short-run and the long-run seems to give credence to the monetary seigniorage 
hypothesis as well as the seigniorage-maximization hypothesis.
4.6 Estimated Results of the Laffer Curve Effect Models
The estimated Laffer Curve Effect Models for the long-run and short-run relationships are 
presented in equations (4.6.1) and (4.6.2) respectively.
;412756.027377.612003.357ˆ 2INFINFIES  [4.6.1]
           (1.1815)     (2.802157)**        (-1.22974)
F-statistic = 19.34694 (0.000 **
R2=0.5111 0.48482 R DW=0.9285
Cointegration Test:
Residual ADF: -4.8511(-4.2165)**
Residual DW statistic: 2.000424      
;111954.0INF0.437151-INF89.0161745.30253IEˆS 1
2
 t [4.6.2]
(1.617049)  (7.931150)**      (-2.719031) ** (-2.667963)**
F-statistic = 62.7094 (0.000 **
R2=0.8431 0.82972 R DW=2.441
The estimated results of the Laffer Curve Effect Models have given credence to the quadratic 
relationship between seigniorage and inflation within the context of Ghana. For the short-run 
model, there exists no autocorrelation as the DW statistic of 2.44 lies within the region of no 
autocorrelation ranging from the lower limit of 1.14 to the upper limit of 2.86 at 1% level of 
significance. The presence of positive autocorrelation associated with the long-run model is not 
strange given the strong positive correlation among the explanatory variables. The non-
significance of the estimated 2 in [4.6.1] does not undermine the relevance of the results since 
under estimation of quadratic functions the marginal effects are not captured by any single 
parameter rather it is 1 2( 2 )tINF  .
20
4.7 Summary of Empirical Findings
The main findings of this study are summarized below:
i. SSA countries generate higher revenue from seigniorage than other developing countries 
across the globe. An average of 4.84% of GDP is generated as seigniorage by SSA 
countries compared to 0.06% by other developing countries bears a testimony to this fact. 
ii. The inverse correlation between the rate of inflation and seigniorage for Belarus (-67%), 
Botswana (-37%), Burundi (-49%), Cambodia (-21%), Estonia (-21%), Kyrgyz Republic 
(-89%), Lithuania (-10%), and Tanzania (-32%) is an indication that these countries 
might be lying at the cost side of their seigniorage-maximizing inflation Laffer curves.
iii. Economic openness directly leads to leakages in seigniorage revenue generation in 
Armenia (-22%), Botswana (-3%), Burundi (-3%), Kyrgyz Republic (-9%), and Zambia 
(-40%).
iv. Dollarisation inversely varies with seigniorage-generation potentials of Belarus (-28%), 
Bolivia (-7%), Kyrgyz Republic (-17%), Lithuania (-55%) and Vietnam (-28%).
v. The Laffer Curve Effect Model in its original state is applicable to the Ghanaian economy
in a manner where higher seigniorage-revenue can be generated in the short-run than in 
the long-run. The estimated coefficients for the short-run and long-run Laffer curve 
effects, given an inflationary threshold of 74% are 24.32 and 0.1859 respectively. The 
estimated results of seigniorage models presented in Table 4.5 have underscored further 
evidence to this finding. Thus, as far as the Ghanaian economy is concerned there is a 
hyperbolic relationship between seigniorage and inflation with a seigniorage-maximizing 
inflation rate of 102% in the short-run and 74% in the long-run6.
vi. For Ghana, the rate of inflation and financial deepening are the most consistent short-run 
and long-run macroeconomic determinants of seigniorage in a positive direction in 
Ghana. A 100% rise in the rate of inflation leads to a five percent rise in seigniorage 
mobilisation in the short-run and long-run. Similarly, a 100% improvement in financial 
deepening results in a five percent rise in seigniorage on average in the short-run and 
more than 1000% rise in seigniorage in the long-run.
vii. In the long-run, economic openness and dollarisation are not statistically significant in 
determining seigniorage in Ghana. In the short-run, however, economic openness and 
dollarisation have adverse effects on seigniorage. Domestic absorption also undermines 
seigniorage generation both in the short and long run. Fiscal budget balance reduces 
seigniorage in the short-run.
viii. The results of Granger Non-Causality Test show that seigniorage generation by 
government has caused economic agents to hedge against the tendencies of inflation by 
way of dollarisation. Economic openness Granger-causes inflation; inflation in turn 
Granger-causes dollarisation. 
                                                
6 Refer to Appendix for details.
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5.0 Policy Implications and Recommendations
Seigniorage is undoubtedly a vital source of revenue for all countries. The rate of inflation is 
crucial to seigniorage generation therefore there is the need for developing countries to 
effectively implement macroeconomic policies to ensure that the rate of inflation does not 
exceed the seigniorage-maximizing threshold rate so as to remain at the benefit side of the Laffer 
curve. For Ghana, this optimal rate of inflation is 74% in the long-run and 102% in the short-run. 
Since it is apparently unsound to prescribe the adoption of inflationary policies to generate 
seigniorage revenue due given overt adverse welfare implications, there is the need for policy re-
direction by the Ghanaian government to generate revenue from other alternative sources rather 
than in the form of inflation tax and seigniorage. Economic policies that would, in the long-run, 
reduce the degree of dollarisation in the Ghanaian economy must be vigorously pursued. In the 
short-run, any rate of inflation exceeding the threshold of 102% would force the Ghanaian 
economy to the cost side of the Laffer curve as far as seigniorage maximization is concerned.
The study also reveals that economic openness is one of the causes of inflation in Ghana. 
Besides, the rate of inflation and seigniorage-generation tendencies result in higher degree of 
dollarisation which would, in the long-run, have negative repercussions for effective monetary 
policy implementation. Consequently, the policy dilemma confronting Ghana as a developing 
country and, indeed, other developing countries of similar macroeconomic structure and size is
how to determine the optimal level of economic openness that would not result in excessive 
dollarisation and spark inflation beyond the optimal rate in the long-run. This problem is more 
complicated given that openness of an economy is a modern development strategy that seeks to 
widen the benefits from foreign trade and promote social and economic progress through job 
creation, capital mobility and consumer sovereignty. 
Both in the short-run and the long-run, financial deepening has been found to be a positive 
determinant of seigniorage in Ghana. This implies that in order to generate substantial revenue 
from seigniorage, there is the need to further deepen the financial sector through the 
implementation of prudent monetary and fiscal policies by the relevant authorities. The 
appropriate policy option for financial deepening should not be directed at further arbitrary 
opening of the macroeconomy by way of increasing imports resulting in capital flight, and 
promotion of unofficial dollarisation through widespread underground and rent seeking 
activities. This is because since economic openness causes inflation and dollarisation in the 
short-run, policies should be directed at export promotion and diversification. It is also suggested 
that complementary policies such as value addition to export commodities in order to stabilize 
the cedi against the major currencies which would, in effect, discourage dollarisation especially 
by way of asset substitution should be aggressively pursued.
In the short-run, dollarisation significantly reduces seigniorage generation capacity of the 
Ghanaian economy. This is possible because in most emerging economies such as Ghana and 
those of SSA, dollarisation driven by asset substitution motive is used as an instrument for 
hedging against higher rates of inflation and exchange rate risks. This implies that as a fiscal 
policy, the implementation of seigniorage-generation policies might be complex and ineffective 
in a small-open dollarized economy unless there is a policy-mix that ensures the growth in 
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money supply is not in arbitrary excess of the relative growth in GDP that maximizes the 
benefits and minimizes the costs of generating seigniorage and monetary policy effectiveness.
6.0 Concluding Remarks
This paper has provided an insight into seigniorage-maximization and inflation within the 
analytical framework of economic openness and dollarisation in developing countries. The main 
objective of this paper is to evaluate how economic openness affects seigniorage maximization 
in emerging economies with special reference to the Ghanaian economy in the face of unofficial 
dollarisation. The main contribution of this paper is to include in the analysis the effects of 
dollarization as precipitated by economic openness on seigniorage-maximizing inflation in 
emerging economies using Ghana as a case study. The formulation of the empirical model is 
hinged on two key issues – (i) the degree of synchronization of economic openness and 
dollarisation for seigniorage maximization, and (ii) the effect and relative importance of inflation 
tax as a component of seigniorage rather than a substitute.
The main empirical results are:
i. Dollarization leads to loss of seigniorage in Ghana.
ii. Dollarisation is high whilst seigniorage is low in developing countries.
iii. Economic openness impacts negatively on seigniorage generation in Ghana.
iv. Seigniorage-maximizing inflation is higher in the short-run than in the long-run.
v. The Ghanaian economy will remain at the benefit side of the seigniorage-maximizing
inflation Laffer curve so long as the rate of inflation does not exceed the long-run 
threshold of 74%.
vi. Seigniorage and inflation tax move together in a positive fashion, the two are not 
perfectly correlated an indication that the two are not identical.
vii. Financial deepening and inflation are significant positive determinants of seigniorage in 
the short-run as well as the long-run whilst domestic absorption negatively affects 
seigniorage in the long-run in Ghana. 
viii. Within the short-run, fiscal budget balance, dollarisation and economic openness are the 
main factors that undermine seigniorage creation in Ghana.
The empirical results assert that as a revenue mobilisation instrument, seigniorage is more 
efficient in the short-run than in the long-run. Therefore, dollarized developing countries should 
not excessively rely on seigniorage as a source of government finance.
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Appendix: Calibration of Laffer Curve Seigniorage-Maximization Inflation Rate
Calibration of Estimated Short-Run Laffer Curve for Ghana
ˆ 0 ˆ 1 ˆ 2 INF ˆ 1*INF ˆ 2*INF2 Calibrated SEI
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 1 89.01617 -0.43715 133.881549
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 2 178.0323 -1.7486 221.586266
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 5 445.0809 -10.9288 479.454605
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 10 890.1617 -43.7151 891.74913
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 15 1335.243 -98.359 1282.186105
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 20 1780.323 -174.86 1650.76553
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 25 2225.404 -273.219 1997.487405
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 30 2670.485 -393.436 2322.35173
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 50 4450.809 -1092.88 3403.23353
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 55 4895.889 -1322.38 3618.810105
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 60 5340.97 -1573.74 3812.52913
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 65 5786.051 -1846.96 3984.390605
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 70 6231.132 -2142.04 4134.39453
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 75 6676.213 -2458.97 4262.540905
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 80 7121.294 -2797.77 4368.82973
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 85 7566.374 -3158.42 4453.261005
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 90 8011.455 -3540.92 4515.83473
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 95 8456.536 -3945.29 4556.550905
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 96 8545.552 -4028.78 4562.071234
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 97 8634.568 -4113.15 4566.717261
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 98 8723.585 -4198.4 4570.488986
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 99 8812.601 -4284.52 4573.386409
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 100 8901.617 -4371.51 4575.40953
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 101 8990.633 -4459.38 4576.558349
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 102 9079.649 -4548.12 4576.832866
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 103 9168.666 -4637.73 4576.233081
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 104 9257.682 -4728.23 4574.758994
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 105 9346.698 -4819.59 4572.410605
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 106 9435.714 -4911.83 4569.187914
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 107 9524.73 -5004.94 4565.090921
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 108 9613.746 -5098.93 4560.119626
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 109 9702.763 -5193.79 4554.274029
45.30253 89.01617 -0.43715 110 9791.779 -5289.53 4547.55413
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Calibration of Estimated Long-Run Laffer Curve for Ghana
ˆ 0 ˆ 1 ˆ 2 INF ˆ 1*INF ˆ 2*INF2 Calibrated SEI
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 1 61.27377 -0.41276 418.061314
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 2 122.5475 -1.65102 478.096816
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 5 306.3689 -10.3189 653.25025
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 10 612.7377 -41.2756 928.6624
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 20 1225.475 -165.102 1417.5733
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 25 1531.844 -257.973 1631.07205
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 30 1838.213 -371.48 1823.933
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 40 2450.951 -660.41 2147.7415
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 50 3063.689 -1031.89 2388.9988
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 60 3676.426 -1485.92 2547.7049
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 65 3982.795 -1743.89 2596.10125
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 70 4289.164 -2022.5 2623.8598
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 71 4350.438 -2080.7 2626.934974
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 72 4411.711 -2139.73 2629.184636
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 73 4472.985 -2199.58 2630.608786
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 74 4534.259 -2260.25 2631.207424
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 75 4595.533 -2321.75 2630.98055
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 76 4656.807 -2384.08 2629.928164
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 77 4718.08 -2447.23 2628.050266
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 78 4779.354 -2511.21 2625.346856
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 79 4840.628 -2576.01 2621.817934
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 80 4901.902 -2641.64 2617.4635
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 85 5208.27 -2982.16 2583.30865
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 90 5514.639 -3343.32 2528.516
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 95 5821.008 -3725.12 2453.08555
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 100 6127.377 -4127.56 2357.0173
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 105 6433.746 -4550.63 2240.31125
357.2003 61.27377 -0.41276 110 6740.115 -4994.35 2102.9674
